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monopoly [2018/04/23 23:57]
ntnsndr [Public utility regulation]
monopoly [2018/05/30 10:30]
ntnsndr [Platform economy antitrust]
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     * Gestures toward such suggestions as: disaggregating Google services across multiple firms; using government power to require default adoption of a competitor such as Bing     * Gestures toward such suggestions as: disaggregating Google services across multiple firms; using government power to require default adoption of a competitor such as Bing
     * "The case of Google requires us to consider all alternatives,​ including the deliberate use of public resources to maintain effective choice in information sources on the Internet."​     * "The case of Google requires us to consider all alternatives,​ including the deliberate use of public resources to maintain effective choice in information sources on the Internet."​
 +  * [Freedom from Facebook](https://​freedomfromfb.com/​) - a campaign to "Break up Facebook'​s Monopoly",​ led by Demand Progress and others
   * Haucap, Justus and Ulrich Heimeshoff. "​[Google,​ Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the Internet driving competition or market monopolization?​](https://​link.springer.com/​article/​10.1007/​s10368-013-0247-6)."​ _International Economics and Economic Policy_ 11, no 1-2 (February 2014).   * Haucap, Justus and Ulrich Heimeshoff. "​[Google,​ Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the Internet driving competition or market monopolization?​](https://​link.springer.com/​article/​10.1007/​s10368-013-0247-6)."​ _International Economics and Economic Policy_ 11, no 1-2 (February 2014).
     * "we use our theoretical insights to examine whether (a) leading Internet platforms have non-temporary market power and, based on this analysis, (b) whether any specific market regulation beyond general competition law rules is warranted"​     * "we use our theoretical insights to examine whether (a) leading Internet platforms have non-temporary market power and, based on this analysis, (b) whether any specific market regulation beyond general competition law rules is warranted"​